Merger process in Australia
The model A merger is represented by two parameters: b denotes private benefits to the merging parties, b h > b l ; w denotes social welfare from the merger, w h > w l .
(b, w) is the merging parties' private information.
The regulator's prior beliefs are given by independent probabilities p for b h and q for w h . The regulator can learn the merger type at cost (lower if notification is given).
The merging parties maximize private benefits less any costs (notification, legal, etc.) The regulator maximizes social welfare less any costs (investigation, legal, etc.) C.Choe -AGSM Merger Notification 12
Extensive form game -no notification Stage 1: The parties with type (b, w)-merger decide whether or not to notify.
Stage 2: If the parties do not notify, then the regulator may investigate at cost γ, and Stage 3: Issues proceedings or gives clearance.
Stage 4: Given the regulator's challenge, the parties may choose to contest in the court or no contest.
π: probability of court-found contravention f: penalty for anti-trust infringement c: cost of litigation for both sides (borne by the losing side)
Expected payoffs in case of litigation:
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Extensive form game -notification Stage 1: The parties with type (b, w)-merger decide whether or not to notify. Stage 2: If the parties choose notification at cost n, then the regulator reviews the case at cost γ' < γ, learns the type (b, w), and Stage 3: Raises concerns or gives clearance. Stage 4: Given the regulator's concerns, the parties may choose to Withdraw transactions, or Offer undertakings that weakly increase social welfare and reduce private benefits to b(1α), 0 < α < 1, or Proceed with the merger, which is followed by the court proceedings.
Equilibrium under compulsory notificationbackward induction Stage 4: Given the regulator's concerns, the parties' best response is 
Give clearance' if the parties choose 'merge and contest' and w > f -c(1-π)/π.
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Equilibrium under compulsory notificationbackward induction Proposition 2: Given assumptions 1 ((b h , w h ) sufficiently larger than (b l , w l )) and 2 (notification cost not too large), compulsory notification leads to (b h , w h )-type mergers cleared;
(b h , w l )-type mergers challenged and contested in the court;
The rest are settled into negotiated outcomes.
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Equilibrium under voluntary notification Stage 4: If the regulator issues proceedings after investigation, the parties' best response is
Stage 3: Given the parties' best response in stage 4, the regulator's decision is 'Issue proceedings' if the parties choose 'contest' and w ≤ f -c(1-π)/π; 'Issue proceedings' if the parties choose 'no contest' and w ≤ f; 'Clear' otherwise.
Equilibrium under voluntary notification
Lemma 3: The subgame following the regulator's investigation has the outcomes:
(b h , w h ) and (b l , w h )-type mergers cleared;
(b l , w l )-type mergers challenged and parties offer no defense.
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Equilibrium under voluntary notification: parties' notification decision
Parties' notification decision depends on the regulator's investigation probability σ, and the outcomes in Lemma 3 following the investigation. Parties with (b h , w h ) and (b l , w h )-type mergers are cleared after investigation. Thus they are better off without notification. Parties with (b h , w l )-type mergers are challenged after investigation, which they will contest. Thus they are better off without notification.
Parties with (b l , w l )-type mergers are challenged after investigation and they offer no defense. Thus their notification decision depends on the investigation probability.
Their expected payoff is b l (1 -α) -n with notification, and σ(-f) + (1 -σ)b l without notification.
They choose notification and negotiation if σ ≥ (b l α + n)/(b l + f).
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Pooling equilibrium under voluntary notification Pooling equilibrium: If the regulator's investigation probability is small enough (σ ≤ (b l α + n)/(b l + f)), then none of the parties choose notification.
If the regulator does not investigate any merger, then its expected payoff is E µ (w) = qw h + (1 -q)w l where µ is the regulator's belief about merger type, same as the prior belief.
If the regulator investigates, then its expected payoff is
Thus the regulator chooses investigation probability σ such that
Pooling equilibrium under voluntary notification Proposition 4: If the cost of investigation or the proportion of mergers with high social welfare are large enough, then a pooling equilibrium exists where None of the parties choose notification,
The regulator investigates a merger with probability 0 ≤ σ ≤ (b l α + n)/(b l + f), and
The outcome following investigation is as in Lemma 3.
Separating equilibrium under voluntary notification
Separating equilibrium: If the regulator's investigation probability satisfies σ ≥ (b l α + n)/(b l + f)), then only the parties with (b l , w l )-type mergers choose notification.
In the absence of notification, the regulator's updated beliefs are
If the regulator does not investigate any merger, then its expected payoff is E µ (w) = [qw h + p(1 -q)w l ] / [q + p(1-p)].
If the regulator investigates, then its expected payoff is
E µ (W) = {qw h + p(1 -q)[πf + (1-π)(w l -c)]-γ} / [q + p(1-p)].
C.Choe -AGSM Merger Notification 22
Separating equilibrium under voluntary notification Proposition 5: If w l is small enough, then a separating equilibrium exists where
Only the parties with (b l , w l )-type mergers choose notification, and settle into negotiated outcomes;
The regulator investigates other mergers with probability σ ≥ (b l α + n)/(b l + f), and the outcomes following investigation are as in Lemma 3. Empirical implications and prior studies Empirical implications for Australian mergers (voluntary notification)
Notified mergers are associated with low private benefits compared to mergers that are not notified.
Mergers with high social welfare are less likely to be notified and more likely to be cleared after investigation.
Mergers that are objected to and contested by the parties are associated with high private benefits.
Existing studies on the US and European mergers (compulsory notification) Private benefits estimated by cumulative abnormal returns are positive for targets, negative for bidders. Combined abnormal returns are positive.
Transactions involving regulatory challenge experience strong positive returns.
Estimation of social welfare, notification and enforcement costs is an unresolved issue. 
Summary of the main results
Merger notification A leading regime is compulsory pre-merger notification. The rationale is to avoid costly litigation and reach a negotiated settlement and higher social welfare before anti-competitive mergers are consummated. This is at the costs of enforcement for the regulator and notification for the merging parties. Voluntary pre-merger notification achieves similar outcomes but at lower costs.
In the separating equilibrium, mergers that are not likely to cause anti-trust concerns are not notified, which significantly reduces the regulator's enforcement burden.
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Analysis of Australian mergers partially supports our findings.
A majority of un-notified mergers that are investigated ex post are cleared.
Un-notified mergers that are investigated ex post and cleared are associated with larger private benefits.
Further analysis is needed incorporating the measure of social welfare, the costs of enforcement and notification.
